On August 13, 2025, the Second Department issued a decision in AccessLex Inst. v. Clunis, 2025 NY Slip Op. 04613, holding that a motion for summary judgment made before the close of discovery is not premature when the non-movant cannot identify additional discovery needed to oppose the motion, explaining:
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the plaintiff’s motion should not have been denied on the ground that it was premature. A grant of summary judgment is not premature merely because discovery has not been completed. In order for a motion for summary judgment to be denied as premature, the opposing party must provide an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were in the exclusive knowledge and control of the moving party.
Here, the proffered need of the defendant to conduct discovery did not warrant denial of the plaintiff’s motion, as the mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).