Receiver’s Claims Barred by In Pari Delicto Doctrine

On October 13, 2026, the First Department issued a decision in Castleman v. Interactive Brokers LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op. 05904, holding that a receiver’s claims were barred by the in pari delicto doctrine, explaining:

The common law doctrine of in pari delicto mandates that the courts will not intercede to resolve a dispute between two wrongdoers. In other words, the doctrine bars a corporation engaged in wrongdoing from suing its co-conspirators on the grounds of negligence or fraud. The justice of the in pari delicto rule is most obvious where a willful wrongdoer is suing someone who is alleged to be merely negligent. The notion that a wrongdoer should not profit from his own misconduct is so strong in New York that we have said the defense applies even in difficult cases and should not be weakened by exceptions.

The wrongdoer’s misconduct is not only imputed to the corporation through the bad acts of its officers, but also to the corporation’s successors.

Plaintiff argues, and the dissent agrees, that the in pari delicto doctrine does not apply to plaintiff because he is not a derivative shareholder plaintiff or a bankruptcy trustee appointed pursuant to 11 USC § 541, but rather a receiver appointed pursuant to 28 USC § 3103. It is true that plaintiff, as a receiver, is not subject to section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. Nevertheless, there is no significant difference between bankruptcy trustees and nonbankruptcy receivers for purposes of in pari delicto.

The Bankruptcy Code defines the bankruptcy estate as all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property and authorizes bankruptcy trustees to pursue claims on behalf of the estate to preserve or maximize the value of the estate and returns for creditors. Similarly, the federal receivership statute grants receivers the authority to take possession of real and personal property and sue for, collect, and sell obligations upon such conditions and for such purposes as the court shall direct. Both bankruptcy trustees and federal receivers are representative fiduciaries who take control of the entity’s assets and pursue claims on its behalf for the benefit of innocent creditors or investors. There is thus no basis to differentiate bankruptcy trustees from receivers when applying in pari delicto.

Application of the doctrine to receivers is not novel. Courts have applied in pari delicto to receivers seeking tort damages against third parties. Here, plaintiff receiver, acting on behalf of the corporate malefactors, seeks damages against an alleged third-party co-conspirator accused of negligence. His tort claims against IBKR therefore fall squarely within the doctrine.

The dissent argues that the doctrine does not apply because plaintiff brings this action solely for the benefit of innocent investors. However, this argument was expressly rejected by the Court of Appeals in Kirschner and is unavailing in light of the nature of plaintiff’s role as a receiver. In Kirschner, the plaintiffs (the trustee and derivative shareholders) asked the Court of Appeals to reinterpret New York law so as to broaden the remedies available to creditors or shareholders of a corporation whose management engaged in financial fraud that was allegedly either assisted or not detected at all or soon enough by the corporation’s outside professional advisors, such as auditors, investment bankers, financial advisers and lawyers. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked the Court to revise New York precedents relating to in pari delicto or imputation for reasons of public policy to recompense the innocent and make outside professionals responsible for their negligence and misconduct in cases of corporate fraud.

The Court declined to do so, holding that the principles of in pari delicto and imputation, with its narrow adverse interest exception, which are embedded in New York law, remain sound. The Court considered the impact of the doctrine on the interests of the corporate fraudsters’ innocent stakeholders versus the third-party entities’ innocent stakeholders who were not involved in allegedly aiding and abetting the fraudulent conduct. The Court determined that to reimagine the doctrine would create a double standard whereby the innocent stakeholders of the corporation’s outside professionals are held responsible for the sins of their errant agents while the innocent stakeholders of the corporation itself are not charged with knowledge of their wrongdoing agents. Ultimately, it was not persuaded that altering New York’s precedent to expand remedies for these or similarly situated plaintiffs would produce a meaningful additional deterrent to professional misconduct or malpractice. Based on this analysis, the Court held that the trustee’s status as a representative fiduciary acting for the benefit of innocent creditors did not exempt him from the doctrine. Although the claims here are asserted by a receiver, Kirschner’s holding applies to this case.

The Second Circuit has held that Kirschner, as a general matter, has settled the question of whether the in pari delicto doctrine precludes a corporation engaged in wrongdoing from suing (on its own behalf or by a successor entity) its co-conspirators for negligence. While In re Tribune involved a claim by a bankruptcy trustee, the same has been found with respect to claims brought by a trustee appointed under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) for the benefit of victims of Bernie Madoff’s scheme. The Second Circuit held that the SIPA-appointed trustee could not bring suit against the third-party financial institutions which aided and abetted the fraud despite the trustee’s assertion that any funds recovered would benefit blameless unsecured creditors and shareholders.

Plaintiff is a representative of the corporation and stands in its shoes, as the subject order specifically appointed the receiver for the Receivership Defendants, not the innocent customers/investors. The complaint acknowledges that the June 2022 order appointed plaintiff as the permanent Receiver for EminiFX and its affiliates or subsidiaries owned or controlled by EminiFX. Plaintiff’s claims belong to the corporation, regardless of whether the innocent customers/investors are the intended beneficiaries of this action as emphasized by plaintiff and the dissent. Consequently, as with a derivative plaintiff or trustee who “stands in the shoes of corporate malefactors, plaintiff’s powers are bound by the rights of the entity in receivership. A receiver plaintiff has no greater rights or powers than the corporation itself would have.

Here, as the Kirschner Court found, plaintiff’s position would require us to favor EminiFX’s innocent customers/investors over that of IBKR’s innocent third-party shareholders. Adopting plaintiff’s contentions would ignore applicable precedent from the State’s highest court. There is no doubt that the fraud perpetrated against the innocent investors was very serious, but those facts do not change the status of the receiver or place the receiver in the shoes of the innocent investors. The order clearly appointed the receiver as a representative of EminiFX and its affiliates and subsidiaries. As a representative fiduciary of the corporation, the role of the receiver is in part to collect and preserve the corporation’s assets to the fullest extent possible, but it must do so within the bounds of the rights of the corporation. The identity of the ultimate beneficiaries is irrelevant because the claims belong to the wrongdoing entity represented by the receiver, not to the customers. As the corporation may not sue its co-conspirator for negligence or fraud, neither may its successor, plaintiff receiver. Accordingly, in pari delicto bars plaintiff’s claims against IBKR.

The narrow adverse interest exception as asserted by the plaintiff is not applicable. The adverse interest exception provides that when an agent is engaged in a scheme to defraud his principal, either for his own benefit or that of a third person, the imputation of the agent’s knowledge to his principal fails because he cannot be presumed to have disclosed that which would expose and defeat his fraudulent purpose. The agent must have totally abandoned his principal’s interests and acted entirely for his own or another’s purposes.

Plaintiff argues that there is a question whether Alexandre as an agent acted completely for his own benefit. Plaintiff argues that Alexandre’s conduct of making risky investments after having syphoned off the company’s money into his personal account could fall within the narrow adverse interest exemption.

Even if the allegations in the complaint sufficiently support the adverse interest exception, the court correctly rejected this argument under the sole actor rule. The rule provides that the adverse interest exception does not apply if the alleged wrongdoer was, at the time of the misconduct, either the sole manager or the sole owner of the entity. Plaintiff does not dispute the court’s finding that the Receiver expressly admitted in the CFTC Action that, at all relevant times, Alexandre was the sole owner of EminiFX who held 100% of the shares. Accordingly, the adverse interest exception does not save plaintiff’s claims from dismissal.

In sum, plaintiff, as a representative fiduciary of EminiFX, the wrongdoing entity, is precluded under in pari delicto from litigating this action against IBKR, an outside financial institution. The fact that plaintiff is an equity receiver as opposed to a bankruptcy trustee or derivative shareholder does not negate the doctrine’s application here, nor does the fact that this action was initiated to benefit innocent EminiFX customers. The receiver stands in the shoes of the corporation while acting in his representative capacity and has no fewer or greater rights than that of the corporation. Furthermore, we are constrained by the holding in Kirschner, which conclusively applies to this case.

(Internal quotations and citations omitted).

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