On March 11, 2026, Justice Patel of the New York County Commercial Division issued a decision in Pepper v. Di Angelo, 2026 NY Slip Op. 30934(U), holding that a purported error in the nature of a reference to a referee was not a basis for vacating a judgment, explaining:
By order dated July 11, 2016, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a default judgment and referred the matter to a Special Referee for an inquest on damages. The order of reference directed that the matter proceed to an inquest on damages, and did not expressly state whether the Special Referee was to hear and report or hear and determine. Thereafter, an inquest on damages was conducted before Special Referee Jeffrey A. Helewitz on May 14, 2018. Defendant did not appear at the inquest proceedings. Following the inquest, the Special Referee issued a written determination awarding damages to Plaintiffs.
The disposition form reflects that the reference was disposed of in accordance with report/determination, with “Determination” circled, and the matter was marked as “hear and determine.” The Referee directed the Clerk to enter judgment.
Judgment was subsequently entered on August 13, 2018, in favor of Plaintiffs Melissa Pepper and Peter Stawinski against Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of $154,823.33, together with statutory interest and costs, and in favor of Plaintiff Peter Rojas in the amount of $82,080.00, together with interest and costs. . . .
Defendant did not object to the scope of the Referee’s authority during the inquest proceedings, did not move to stay entry of judgment, and did not seek appellate review following entry of judgment.
Against this procedural backdrop, Defendant now moves, years after entry of judgment, to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4), arguing that the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction based upon the alleged scope of the referee’s authority.
Defendant moves pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4) to vacate the judgment on the grounds that it is void for lack of jurisdiction. The issue presented is whether the alleged defect concerning the scope of reference to the Special Referee constitutes a jurisdictional defect rendering the judgment void. CPLR 5015(a)(4) is limited to true jurisdictional defects, namely the absence of subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction; it does not provide relief for procedural errors committed in the course of an otherwise valid proceeding.
Here, the Supreme Court is a court of general jurisdiction and possessed subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Defendant does not dispute that the Court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over this action. To the extent Defendant previously asserted that the default judgment was invalid due to improper service, that contention was rejected by this Court in a prior Decision and Order dated July 11, 2025, which found that the record established service pursuant to CPLR 308(2).
Rather, Defendant argues only that the order of reference did not expressly authorize the Special Referee to hear and determine, and that the absence of a CPLR 4403 confirmation motion renders the judgment void. That argument conflates procedural error with a jurisdictional defect. Even assuming, arguendo, that the reference should have been treated as one to hear and report rather than hear and determine, any resulting defect would constitute an error committed within the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction, not an absence of jurisdiction. A challenge to the scope of a referee’s authority concerns the manner in which the court exercised its jurisdiction, not the existence of jurisdiction itself. Such an error would render the judgment, at most, voidable, not void, within the meaning of CPLR 5015(a)(4).
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).