On December 10, 2025, the Second Department issued a decision in LNV Corp. v. King, 2025 NY Slip Op. 06851, holding that a motion for intervention was properly denied because of unreasonable delay in seeking it, explaining:
Intervention pursuant to CPLR 1012 or 1013 requires a timely motion. In considering whether a motion to intervene is timely, courts do not engage in mere mechanical measurements of time, but consider whether the delay in seeking intervention would cause a delay in resolution of the action or otherwise prejudice a party. Another factor is the extent of the time lag between the making of the motion and the proposed intervenor’s acquisition of knowledge of the circumstances upon which the motion for leave to intervene is based.
Here, Nashville only moved to intervene in the instant foreclosure action in October 2022, which, as Nashville concedes, was approximately 20 months after its predecessor-in-interest had filed a plenary action seeking related relief and approximately 8 months after the plenary action was dismissed. Further, Nashville failed to demonstrate when it actually became aware of the instant foreclosure action or otherwise explain its delay in moving for leave to intervene. Nashville’s motion was also made more than six years after the order and judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered and the property was sold at auction. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Nashville’s motion which was for leave to intervene.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).