Action Should Have Been Dismissed for Failure to Move for Default Judgment Within One Year of Default

On December 7, 2022, the Second Department issued a decision in U.S. Bank N.A. v. Benitez, 2022 NY Slip Op. 06952, holding that the trial court should have dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for failure to move for a default judgment within one year of the default, explaining:

If the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed. This statute is strictly construed, as the language of CPLR 3215(c) is not, in the first instance, discretionary, but mandatory, inasmuch as courts shall dismiss claims for which default judgments are not sought within the requisite one-year period, as those claims are then deemed abandoned. The statute further provides, however, that the failure to timely seek a default may be excused if sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed. To establish the sufficient cause required by CPLR 3215(c), the plaintiff must proffer a reasonable excuse for the delay in moving for leave to enter a default judgment and demonstrate that the cause of action is potentially meritorious.

Here, despite the fact that Benitez failed to answer or otherwise appear in the action after being served with process, the plaintiff took no steps to initiate proceedings for the entry of a default judgment against Benitez until December 2018, four years after this action was released from the mandatory foreclosure settlement conference part. Further, the plaintiff’s allegations concerning an excuse for its delay in seeking a default judgment were vague, conclusory, and unsubstantiated inasmuch as they were not supported with evidence in admissible form by a person with personal knowledge of the facts. Benitez’s failure to move to vacate his default in answering the complaint or appearing in this action did not operate as a waiver of his right to seek dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c).

(Internal quotations and citations omitted).

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