On November 21, 2025, the Fourth Department issued a decision in Armbruster Capital Mgt., Inc. v. Barrett, 2025 NY Slip Op. 06493, holding that a defamation claim can arise from a false implication based on true facts, explaining:
A party asserting a claim for defamation must show a false statement, published without privilege or authorization to a third party, constituting fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, and it must either cause special harm or constitute defamation per se. Statements that tend to injure another in his or her trade, business or profession constitute defamation per se. In addition, a plaintiff must set forth in the complaint the particular words complained of, as required by CPLR 3016 (a), and must state the time, place and manner of the allegedly false statements and to whom such statements were made.
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Defendants sufficiently alleged that the statements made by the individual parties were false and that they were reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation. . . .
Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the statements were substantially true and that defendants are relying on a theory of defamation by implication, we conclude that the proposed amended counterclaim is not patently lacking in merit. Defamation by implication is premised not on direct statements but on false suggestions, impressions and implications arising from otherwise truthful statements. There is a heightened legal standard for a claim of defamation by implication. Under that standard, to survive a motion to dismiss a claim for defamation by implication where the factual statements at issue are substantially true, the party asserting the defamation claim must make a rigorous showing that the language of the communication as a whole can be reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference. The second part of the test is an objective inquiry and asks whether the plain language of the communication itself suggests that an inference was intended or endorsed.
We agree with defendants that they met the heightened pleading standard. As testified to by defendant, the statements that were made do not tell the whole story and convey a false impression that defendant was entirely at fault for the demise of the employment relationship because she found plaintiff’s compliance policies burdensome. But as alleged in the answer, plaintiff’s chief executive officer blamed defendant for the departure of a large client, said that he did not trust her and that she would steal all of plaintiff’s clients, and threatened legal action against her. Defendant resigned from employment shortly after that outburst. Thus the statements by the individual parties, even if true, conveyed the false suggestion and impression that the only reason defendant left plaintiff’s employment was because she did not want to comply with policies that were in place to protect the clients. Furthermore, the plain language of the statements suggested that the individual parties intended that false suggestion and impression so that the clients would remain with plaintiff.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).