On December 12, 2025, Justice Cohen of the New York County Commercial Division issued a decision in Vigeland v. Sand Assoc., L.P., 2025 NY Slip Op. 34822(U), refusing to award fees incurred in making a fee application, explaining:
An award of attorneys’ fees must be reasonable and not excessive. The determination of what constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court.
Here, Plaintiff requests $779,969.50 in attorney’s fees, costs and expenses, plus $33,268.14 in prejudgment interest as prevailing party in this action. Counsel avers that the rates charged are consistent with the rates charged by comparable professionals for this type of litigation, and that the amount of time spent was commensurate with the stakes.
However, the proposed fee award must be reduced for two independent reasons: First, Plaintiff’s application includes $604,051 for counsel’s work preparing the motion seeking entitlement to attorney’s fees as well as this application supporting the amount of fees sought. Putting aside that this appears to be an excessive amount (it is, notably, more than three times the amount sought for litigating the underlying breach of contract action itself), fees expended in pursuit of an award of fees (“fees on fees”) are not recoverable by a prevailing party unless the governing contract is unmistakably clear that such recovery was contemplated. Here, the contract language does not explicitly provide for an award of fees on fees. It simply provides:
Should any party hereto institute any action or proceeding at law or in equity to enforce any provision hereof, including an action for declaratory relief or for damages by reason of an alleged breach of any provision of this Agreement, or otherwise in connection with this Agreement, or any provision hereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the losing party or parties reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for services rendered to the prevailing party in such action or proceeding.
The cases upon which Plaintiff principally relies granted fees on fees where the agreement contained “any and all” language that was found to be broad enough to cover such fees. Even assuming that is correct, there is no such language here. In sum, it is not unmistakably clear from the language in their agreement that the parties intended to authorize recovery of fees on fees. Therefore, the $604,051 portion of the fee request attributable to counsel’s efforts to recover contractual attorney’s fees is denied.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).