On May 14, 2026, Justice Reed of the New York County Commercial Division issued a decision in Computershare Trust Co., N.A. v. Cohen, 2026 NY Slip Op. 50735(U), declining to grant a stay in connection with the withdrawal of counsel, explaining:
CPLR 321 (b) (2) provides:
a]n attorney of record may withdraw or be changed by order of the court in which the action is pending, upon motion on such notice to the client of the withdrawing attorney, to the attorneys of all other parties in the action or, if a party appears without an attorney, to the party, and to any other person, as the court may direct.
If an attorney deems it necessary to end the attorney-client relationship without the consent of the client, the attorney may move on such notice as may be directed by the court, to be relieved as counsel by court order. The decision to grant or deny permission for counsel to withdraw lies within the discretion of the trial court, and the court’s decision should not be overturned absent a showing of an improvident exercise of discretion. Here, attorney Jacobs submits sufficient evidence, by way of attorney affirmation, of a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship sufficient to warrant withdrawal. A party’s failure to pay fees and communicate and cooperate with its attorney are sufficient grounds to grant leave to withdraw.
A stay of an action following an attorney withdrawal is only automatic under CPLR 321(c) on account of the death, removal or disability of an attorney. The court may decline to impose a stay where the court determines from the conduct of the parties that there has been a demonstrated pattern of willful noncompliance with court orders and an a pattern of intentional delay of the litigation process. Also, with respect to any claim of an inability to pay legal fees, the court may discount such claim in the absence of substantiation via financial records, and where the past conduct of a party evidences an intentional frustration of discovery and an intent to delay the litigation process.
In this case, there has been no evidence of delay, willful or contumacious conduct by defendant and no evidence of substantiation of defendant’s inability to pay legal fees. Nevertheless, given, first, that the application is based upon defendant’s alleged refusal to pay his counsel’s bills for services rendered; second, that counsel has failed to request the imposition of a stay in the instant application; and, third, that defendant has failed to oppose his attorney’s request to withdraw, this court finds that the imposition of a stay is not warranted under these circumstances.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).