On September 23, 2026, the Second Department issued a decision in Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Cassis, 2026 NY Slip Op. 05381, holding that counsel’s general appearance waived the client’s personal jurisdiction defense, explaining:
A defendant may waive the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction by appearing in an action, either formally or informally, without raising the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction in an answer or pre-answer motion to dismiss. A defendant appears formally in an action by serving an answer or a notice of appearance, or by making a motion which has the effect of extending the time to answer. A defendant ‘may appear informally by actively litigating the action before the court.
Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the defendant’s participation in settlement conferences pursuant to CPLR 3408 and the limited notice of appearance filed for that purpose on December 17, 2010, did not demonstrate a clear intent to participate in the lawsuit on the merits and thus did not constitute a formal or informal appearance in the action. However, the defendant’s counsel filed a general notice of appearance on October 19, 2012, and did not move to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction at that time or assert lack of personal jurisdiction in a responsive pleading. By waiting another 3½ years before making her April 2016 cross-motion, inter alia, to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her for lack of personal jurisdiction, the defendant waived any claim that the Supreme Court lacked personal jurisdiction over her in this action. The defendant’s contention that the plaintiff waived this issue by failing to raise it in opposition to her April 2016 cross-motion or at the hearing to determine the validity of service of process upon the defendant is without merit.
Accordingly, since the defendant waived the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to restore to the calendar that branch of her April 2016 cross-motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her for lack of personal jurisdiction and thereupon, in effect, granting that branch of her April 2016 cross-motion.
(Internal citations omitted).