On September 2, 2026, the Second Department issued a decision in HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Wharton, 2026 NY Slip Op. 05172, holding that a claim was abandoned because the plaintiff failed to move for a default judgment within one year, explaining:
The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of Property 1501’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against Joy as abandoned. Pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), if the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed. This statute is strictly construed, as the language of CPLR 3215(c) is not, in the first instance, discretionary, but mandatory, inasmuch as courts shall dismiss claims for which default judgments are not sought within the requisite one-year period, as those claims are then deemed abandoned. However, there is an exception to this mandatory dismissal if the plaintiff shows sufficient cause’ as to why the complaint should not be dismissed. This Court has interpreted this language as requiring both a reasonable excuse for the delay in timely moving for a default judgment, plus a demonstration that the cause of action is potentially meritorious. The determination of whether an excuse is reasonable in any given instance is committed to the sound discretion of the motion court.
Property 1501, as successor in interest to Joy, had standing to move pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against Joy. Moreover, here, Property 1501’s submissions established that Joy was served in August 2015 and that the plaintiff did not move for leave to enter a default judgment against Joy within one year of Joy’s default in appearing or answering the complaint. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, its assertion that its delay of more than seven years between Joy’s default and Property 1501’s motion to dismiss was attributable to delays in obtaining letters of administration for the decedent’s estate was insufficient to excuse its substantial delay.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).