On February 4, 2026, the Second Department issued a decision in Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Contact Holdings Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op. 00491, holding that a case dismissed for failure to prosecute was not entitled to tolling under CPLR 205-a, explaining:
The Supreme Court properly granted Contact’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it as time-barred. An action to foreclose a mortgage is governed by a six-year statute of limitations. Even if a mortgage is payable in installments, once a mortgage debt is accelerated, the entire amount is due and the statute of limitations begins to run on the entire debt. The entire mortgage debt will be deemed to have been accelerated by the commencement of a mortgage foreclosure action in which the complaint seeks payment of the full outstanding loan balance.
Here, Contact demonstrated, prima facie, that the mortgage debt was accelerated and the six-year statute of limitations began to run in February 2010, when the plaintiff commenced the 2010 action and elected to call due the entire amount secured by the mortgage. Contact further established, prima facie, that since the plaintiff did not commence this action until 2022, more than six years later, this action was time-barred.
In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled or otherwise inapplicable, or whether it had commenced this action within the applicable limitations period. The Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) replaced the savings provision of CPLR 205(a) with CPLR 205-a in actions, like this one, upon instruments described in CPLR 213(4). Under CPLR 205-a(a), if an action upon an instrument described under [CPLR 213(4)] is timely commenced and is terminated in any manner other than a dismissal of the complaint for any form of neglect, including, but not limited to those specified in CPLR 3215 the original plaintiff, or, if the original plaintiff dies and the cause of action survives, his or her executor or administrator, may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences within six months following the termination, provided that the new action would have been timely commenced within the applicable limitations period prescribed by law at the time of the commencement of the prior action and that service upon the original defendant is completed within such six-month period. Here, there is no dispute that the 2010 action was dismissed as abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215(c). Therefore, under FAPA, the plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of the savings provision of CPLR 205(a) or 205-a.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).