On May 13, 2026, the Second Department issued a decision in U.S. Bank N.A. v. Islam, 2026 NY Slip Op. 03015, holding that an action should be dismissed if the plaintiff failed timely to seek a default judgment, explaining:
CPLR 3215(c) provides that if the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after a defendant’s default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed. The language of CPLR 3215(c) is not, in the first instance, discretionary, but mandatory, inasmuch as courts shall dismiss claims for which default judgments are not sought within the requisite one-year period, as those claims are then deemed abandoned. To establish sufficient cause, the plaintiff must proffer a reasonable excuse for the delay in timely moving for a default judgment and demonstrate that the cause of action is potentially meritorious.
The defendant, having been served pursuant to CPLR 308(2), was required to serve an answer or make a motion having the effect of extending the time to answer within 30 days after service was complete. Pursuant to CPLR 308(2), service is complete 10 days after the filing of proof of service with the clerk of the court. Since proof of service was filed on June 7, 2012, service was complete on June 17, 2012. The defendant was required to answer the complaint or otherwise move for relief by July 17, 2012, but he did not do so and was in default as of that date. Thus, the plaintiff had one year from July 17, 2012, to take proceedings for the entry of judgment against the defendant. However, the plaintiff did not take such proceedings until over two years later, when it moved, inter alia, for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendant and for an order of reference in March 2015. Thus, the plaintiff failed to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the defendant’s default. Although the plaintiff filed a request for judicial intervention requesting a foreclosure settlement conference within the one-year period after the defendant’s default, a settlement conference was not required in this case because the defendant did not reside at the property subject to foreclosure. As such, the filing of the request for judicial intervention did not constitute the taking of proceedings for the entry of a judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) and did not toll the one-year deadline to do so.
Moreover, the plaintiff failed demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its failure to timely take proceedings for the entry of judgment. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the plaintiff’s change of attorney does not constitute a reasonable excuse for its delay in taking proceedings for the entry of judgment under these circumstances, and in any event, the change of attorney occurred after the statutory one year period expired. Since the plaintiff failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for its delay, this Court need not consider whether the plaintiff had a potentially meritorious cause of action.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him as abandoned and denied that branch of the plaintiff’s cross-motion which was for a judgment of foreclosure and sale.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).