On December 20, 2023, Justice Platkin of the Albany County Commercial Division issued a decision in Gujral v. Anesthesia Group of Albany, P.C., 2023 NY Slip Op. 51452(U), holding that a tortious interference with prospective advantage claim failed for failure adequately to allege malicious or wrongful conduct, explaining:
A claim for tortious interference with prospective advantage requires a party to show: (1) that it had a business relationship with a third party; (2) that the defendant knew of that relationship and intentionally interfered with it; (3) that the defendant acted solely out of malice or used improper or illegal means that amounted to a crime or independent tort; and (4) that the defendant’s interference caused injury to the relationship with the third party. While a cause of action for interference with prospective contract or business relationship is closely akin to one for tortious interference with contract, the former requires proof of more culpable conduct on the part of defendant.
. . .
Absent an employment contract, Dr. Gujral was an at-will employee of Samaritan. This is a form of prospective contractual relation that may be tortiously interfered with through malicious or wrongful conduct. Nonetheless, Dr. Gujral has not sufficiently demonstrated that AGA’s letter to Samaritan was wrongful or motivated solely by malice.
Nothing in AGA’s letter was tantamount to physical violence, fraud or misrepresentation, civil suits and criminal prosecutions, or improper economic pressure. Dr. Gujral complains that AGA sent the letter despite his counsel repudiating AGA’s assertion that the restrictive covenant is in effect, but counsel’s argument at the time was that Samaritan Hospital was not listed as a facility owned or contracted to AGA on Exhibit 1 of the 2022 Employment Agreement, an argument that is contrary to the plain language of the Restrictive Covenant. Thus, plaintiff is unlikely to establish that the letter contains false and misleading statements.
Nor has plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success in establishing that AGA acted solely out of malice. Even if the parties’ other business disputes played some role in AGA’s decision to enforce the Restrictive Covenant, AGA is likely to establish that it sent the cease-and-desist letter based, at least in part, on a good-faith belief that Dr. Gujral’s employment with Samaritan violated AGA’s contractual rights and out of a legitimate desire to vindicate its bargained-for rights. And so long as AGA’s letter was intended, at least in part, to advance its own interests, then it was not acting solely to harm the plaintiff.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).