On March 19, 2024, the Court of Appeals issued a decision in Urias v. Daniel P. Buttafuoco & Assoc., PLLC, 2024 NY Slip Op. 01497, holding that a Judiciary Law Section 487 claim may be brough in a plenary action, explaining:
We begin with the question of whether Judiciary Law § 487 permits a plenary action. We thus turn to the plain language of the statute as the clearest indicator of legislative intent. Section 487 provides that:
An attorney or counselor who:
Is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party; or,
Wilfully delays his client’s suit with a view to his own gain; or, wilfully receives any money or allowance for or on account of any money which he has not laid out, or becomes answerable for,
Is guilty of a misdemeanor, and in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor by the penal law, he forfeits to the party injured treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action.
This provision is the modern-day counterpart of a statute dating from the first decades after Magna Carta; its language virtually (and remarkably) unchanged from that of a law adopted by New York’s Legislature two years before the United States Constitution was ratified. Recognizing that our legal system depends on the integrity of attorneys who fulfill the role of officers of the court, furthering its truth-seeking function, the statute creates a cause of action for attorney deceit that is distinct from common law fraud or legal malpractice. Given the importance of safeguarding the integrity of the judicial system, section 487 allows for both criminal liability and a civil remedy in the form of treble damages. We recognize, of course, that common law has long shielded a final judgment from collateral attack in a subsequent action. Although subsequent actions have been permitted for fraud that is extrinsic to the underlying proceeding, or part of a larger fraudulent scheme, the interest in finality of judgments generally constrains a court’s authority to revisit a final judgment in a collateral action. Such a challenge may instead be brought under CPLR 5015, which authorizes the court which rendered a judgment or order to relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just upon the ground of, among others, fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.
Buttafuoco argues that allowing plaintiff to bring a section 487 claim as a plenary action would implicate these concerns. He correctly points out that, although Ms. Urias does not technically seek to vacate the orders of the medical malpractice court approving the fee award, she seeks to recoup the difference between the actual fee charged and the amount she contends was permissible under the fee schedule as a remedy for alleged deceit in procuring that award. Moreover, the conduct at issue is not extrinsic to the underlying medical malpractice action, and the claim for damages does not arise from allegations of a more extensive fraudulent scheme.
We conclude, however, that section 487 authorizes a plenary action for attorney deceit under these circumstances. The text of the statute allows recovery of treble damages in a civil action where an attorney is guilty of any deceit or collusion with intent to deceive the court or any party. The phrase “in a civil action” is most naturally read to include a plenary action. Notably, the provision does not differentiate between an action that might undermine or undo a final judgment and one that does not, or between allegations of fraud that are intrinsic to the underlying action, as opposed to extrinsic. Interpreting the statute to permit a plenary action where the remedy would not entail undermining a final judgment (for example, when the deceit harms a prevailing party), but deny one where a final judgment could be impaired, would require us to rewrite the statute. That we cannot do.
Buttafuoco contends that Ms. Urias was relegated to bringing a motion to vacate under CPLR 5015. That path may well be available as a general matter, but section 487 cannot be read to make CPLR 5015 the exclusive avenue here. Not only does the text of the provision suggest that a plenary action is available in all instances of attorney deceit, but section 487’s long lineage also confirms that conclusion. The cause of action was descended from the first Statute of Westminster adopted in England in 1275, incorporated in New York’s earliest common law, and first codified in this State in a 1787 statute that closely tracks the current provision. Its legislative history reflects a consistent view, taken over centuries, that attorney deceit in the course of litigation warrants substantial penalties—both criminal liability and treble damages. By comparison, CPLR 5015 offers a discretionary remedy that includes restitution in like manner and subject to the same conditions as where a judgment is reversed or modified on appeal. Such relief is markedly different from that authorized by section 487, and we decline to confine a plaintiff alleging attorney deceit to the sole option of proceeding under CPLR 5015.
We appreciate that it might be more efficient to require a plaintiff who either directly or effectively challenges a judgment to return to the court that issued it and seek vacatur under CPLR 5015, and we note that transfer of a plenary action to the court that handled the underlying proceedings may be desirable where consistent with the CPLR’s venue provisions. Nor do we take lightly the interest in preserving the finality of judgments. But the legislature has singled out the specific type of claim here—an allegation of attorney deceit on the court or a party—and determined that recovery of treble damages should be available in a civil action. We conclude that section 487 must be read to allow a plenary action for deceit, even where success on that claim might undermine a separate final judgment.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the plaintiff had failed adequately to allege a violation of Section 487.