Testimony Barred by Dead Man’s Statute

On October 28, 2026, Justice Reed of the New York County Commercial Division issued a decision in Slabakis v. Olympos Trading Corp., 2026 NY Slip Op. 51825(U), holding that testimony was barred by the Dead Man’s Statute, explaining:

Dead Man’s Statute — Even if plaintiff were allowed to offer parol testimony to oppose defendants’ motion, CPLR 4519, the Dead Man’s Statute, prevents any person interested in the event from testifying to a personal transaction with the deceased against the deceased’s executor, administrator, or survivor. An interested witness is one who will gain or lose by the effect of the judgment. As plaintiff is an interested witness, because he stands to benefit if his testimony is accepted as true, the Dead Man’s Statute bars his testimony at trial.

Testimony barred by the Dead Man’s Statute can be used to oppose a motion for summary judgment, where such testimony is not the only evidence presented to defeat the motion, and where the court is certain that the statute would not be waived at trial. Similarly, the court may consider incompetent evidence, such as hearsay, in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, provided that it is not the only evidence.

The evidence plaintiff submits to demonstrate that he was an owner of 20% of the properties and that the Buyout Agreement was made is not admissible or does not prove the facts that plaintiff claims it proves. In 1982, plaintiff signed mortgage loans from the Bank to Olympus and 152 MAPC, wherein plaintiff was identified as president of those corporations. In one of the loans, plaintiff was identified as representing Olympus; no title was included. Occupation of the presidency and/or signing the mortgage does not show that plaintiff was an owner. An individual may be an officer of a corporation without being a shareholder. For instance, Georgeitseas testified that he signed documents as vice president of 152 MAPC, that he was not an owner, and that only Samourkas was an owner.

Plaintiff points to further evidence that he claims raises an issue of fact as to his ownership of the corporations. John DiConza, vice president and loan officer of the Bank that made the mortgage loans to Olympos and 152 MAPC in 1982, was deposed. DiConza testified that plaintiff was introduced to him as a broker. He testified to a recollection that plaintiff owned 10% or 20% of Olympos and that the Bank received personal financial documents from plaintiff and his partner showing their ownership amounts. Under Bank rules, the person signing the mortgages property had to own at least 20% of the property. DiConza’s understanding was that plaintiff had an ownership percentage in 152 MAPC and Olympos. DiConza said that to issue a mortgage, the Bank had to confirm ownership, conduct research, and examine tax documents. But when the senior partner and partner allow the project to go further, it is expected that we are dealing with honest people who tell us what we need and provide the documentation as required. The Bank must verify the correct percentage of ownership in going forward, and the ownership would have to be a minimum of 20%.

DiConza testified that he met Samourkas in 1982. He knew that Samourkas was the majority owner of the corporations. Samourkas gave me every indication that he was a partner, a senior partner, but a partner with plaintiff. And again I had the documentation before then. DiConza left the bank in 1984.

DiConza was asked whether plaintiff or Samourkas told him that plaintiff had ownership in Olympos or 152 MAPC. DiConza could not remember exact verbiage, forty years ago. I had every indication that there was, but nothing was said to me that I remember. He testified that he obtained appropriate documentation from plaintiff showing 10 or 20 percent ownership.

Hearsay is an out of court statement offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted in the statement. Deposition testimony can be hearsay. DiConza had no first-hand knowledge and no records evidencing plaintiff’s ownership. He was told that plaintiff was an owner. He testified that plaintiff must have been an owner since the Bank would not have allowed a nonowner of a property to mortgage it. He had no more definite proof. The court finds that DiConza’s evidence is based on hearsay and is also vague and speculative. As such it does not raise an issue of fact regarding whether plaintiff owned 20% of the properties.

Marshall Kanter was a manager in an office that managed the properties. His affidavit states that his understanding was that plaintiff was one of the investors. Garrett Bowden worked at a real estate brokerage and management company. He was assigned to manage 576 Fifth and he testified that he met one of the owners, who was plaintiff. Bruce Midler, a CPA, prepared plaintiff’s 1985 tax returns, which are attached to Midler’s affidavit. He recalls that plaintiff did receive a large sum of money from his Greek partners in 1985 and that plaintiff advised me that he had received a $1.1 million dollar down payment on a buyout agreement, that he worked as a broker in 1985 and that he had invested $450,000 into the properties from which he was bought out. He further states that the information provided by plaintiff is consistent with the information on the 1985 tax returns. Kanter does not explain this statement by reference to the returns and the returns do not show that plaintiff owned the properties.

The evidence proffered by these witnesses is inadmissible as hearsay and, additionally, is the only evidence apart from plaintiff’s evidence, which is barred by the Dead Man’s Statute.

(Internal quotations and citations omitted).

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