On August 26, 2026, the Second Department issued a decision in Benjamin v. Yeroushalmi, 2026 NY Slip Op. 05071, holding that a prevailing party was entitled to fees on a contempt motion, explaining:
The failure to obey a lawful order of a court is a species of contempt. The aim of civil contempt is to vindicate a party’s right to the benefits of a judicial mandate or to compensate that party for the interference by the contemnor. A motion to punish a party for civil contempt is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and the movant bears the burden of proving the contempt by clear and convincing evidence. The movant must establish (1) that a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect, (2) that the party against whom contempt is sought disobeyed the order, (3) that the party who disobeyed the order had knowledge of its terms, and (4) that the movant was prejudiced by the offending conduct. For civil contempt, the movant need not establish willful disobedience, but the conduct must be intentional—not unwitting.
Here, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was pursuant to Judiciary Law § 753(A) to hold Kahen in civil contempt. The record demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that Kahen knowingly disobeyed the clear and unequivocal mandates of the February 2022 order, and that the plaintiffs were prejudiced by Kahen’s contemptuous conduct. Contrary to Kahen’s contentions, the evidence presented at the hearing failed to show that he substantially complied with the directives of the February 2022 order or that his failure to comply lacked the requisite intentionality.
Judiciary Law § 773 permits recovery of attorney’s fees from the offending party by a party aggrieved by contemptuous conduct. The intent of Judiciary Law § 773 is to indemnify the aggrieved party for costs and expenses incurred as a result of the contempt. Attorney’s fees that are documented and directly related to the contemptuous conduct are generally recoverable unless they are proven excessive or reduced by the court in a reasoned decision.
Here, the attorney’s fees and expenses awarded to the plaintiffs by the Supreme Court were sufficiently documented, were a direct product of Kahen’s contemptuous conduct, and were reasonable in amount. Thus, the award of attorney’s fees and expenses was appropriate pursuant to Judiciary Law § 773.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).