On July 10, 2026, Justice Grays of the Queens County Commercial Division issued a decision in Kim v. Radiology Assoc. of Main St., P.C., 2026 NY Slip Op. 51050(U), holding that an alleged release did not bar a money had and received claim, explaining:
Plaintiff alleges that the defendant has failed and refused to forward the proceeds which it received as policy administrator to plaintiff as it claims entitlement to said proceeds based upon plaintiff’s execution of the consent form forwarded by MLMIC as required for its demutualization. Defendant argues that plaintiff assigned her ownership interests in said proceeds to defendant via said consent form. Plaintiff, however, contends that the sole purpose of the consent was to appoint defendant as her agent for purposes of receiving the proceeds as defendant did not have authority to do so without this designation. Plaintiff by her action denies that any interest was assigned, transferred or conveyed to defendant and seeks return of the funds. Her Complaint alleges causes of action sounding in conversion, unjust enrichment, and money had and received as well as two separate claims of breach of fiduciary duty, one seeking damages and the other, rescission.
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[P]laintiff’s claims stating a cause of action for money had and received were sufficient for purposes of CPLR §3211(a)(7) as plaintiff has sufficiently pled that defendant received money belonging to plaintiff, defendant has benefitted from the receipt of that money, and defendant’s retention of that money is unconscionable. Although defendant argues that plaintiff cannot assert causes of action for money had and received because the consent acted as a contract by and between plaintiff and defendant, this is not true. The consent was offered by MLMIC and relates only to the extension of defendant’s authority from policy administrator to policy administrator with the additional specific authority to receive demutualization distributions on behalf of the policyholder.
Furthermore, defendant’s arguments that plaintiff’s claims for money had and received and unjust enrichment do not lie because they are quasi-contract in nature, and, therefore, are duplicative, must fail as plaintiff has not pled any cause of action sounding in breach of contract. The existence of a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quasi-contract for events arising out of the same subject matter. In the case at hand, plaintiff has not pled breach of contract. Therefore, her quasi-contract claims are proper at this juncture and plaintiff is entitled to plead alternative theories of recovery.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).