On January 8, 2025, the Second Department issued a decision in Gutierrez v. Hillside Hotel, LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op. 00083, holding that a defendant could not challenge service at address designated for service with the Secretary of State, even though that address was outdated, explaining:
The Supreme Court properly determined that the defendant failed to demonstrate its entitlement to relief pursuant to CPLR 317. That section permits a defendant who has been served with a summons other than by personal delivery to defend the action upon a finding by the court that the defendant did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a meritorious defense. Mere denial of receipt of the summons and complaint is insufficient to warrant relief under CPLR 317. Here, the defendant failed to demonstrate that it did not receive actual notice of the action in time to defend itself.
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the defendant failed to demonstrate that vacatur of the default order or the judgment was warranted on the ground that the plaintiff improperly served the interlocutory papers in this action, including the plaintiff’s motion, inter alia, for leave to enter a default judgment, at an incorrect address. The failure to provide a defendant with proper notice of a motion renders the resulting order and judgment entered upon that order nullities, warranting vacatur pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4). A defendant may establish that a motion was improperly served by proffering evidence that the plaintiff mailed the motion papers to an incorrect address. However, the defendant failed to make such a showing. The plaintiff served the defendant at the same address that the defendant had designated for service of process in its biennial statement filed with the New York State Department of State, and the defendant did not update such address until nearly a year after entry of the judgment in the instant action. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the mere fact that the address designated by the defendant for service of process differed from the address of the defendant’s property where the plaintiff’s injury occurred was insufficient to put the plaintiff on notice that the designated address was outdated. Moreover, there is no evidence that the defendant gave the plaintiff notice of a change in address. Accordingly, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s service of interlocutory papers in this action was improper.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).