On March 19, 2025, the Second Department issued a decision in Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v. Nifenecker, 2025 NY Slip Op. 01666, dismissing claims for failure to move for default judgment within one year of the default, explaining:
CPLR 3215(c) provides that if the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after a defendant’s default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion. It is not necessary for a plaintiff to actually obtain a judgment within one year after the default to avoid a CPLR 3215(c) dismissal, so long as proceedings were undertaken to do so during the initial year after the defendant’s default. The language of CPLR 3215(c) is not, in the first instance, discretionary, but mandatory, inasmuch as courts shall dismiss claims for which default judgments are not sought within the requisite one-year period, as those claims are then deemed abandoned. Failure to take proceedings for entry of judgment may be excused, however, upon a showing of sufficient cause. To establish sufficient cause, the party opposing dismissal must demonstrate that it had a reasonable excuse for the delay in taking proceedings for entry of a default judgment and that it has a potentially meritorious action.
Where an action is subject to a mandatory settlement conference, motions shall be held in abeyance while conferences are held, and the one-year deadline imposed by CPLR 3215(c) is tolled.
Here, Reddy was served pursuant to CPLR 308(4) on July 16, 2015, and the affidavit of service was filed on August 4, 2015. Thus, service was complete 10 days later, on August 14, 2015. Reddy defaulted by failing to appear or answer the complaint within 30 days after service was complete. Contrary to Limosa’s contention, BANA took no proceedings toward entry of a default judgment against Reddy until December 2017, when BANA moved, inter alia, for leave to enter a default judgment and for an order of reference, which was more than a year after the expiration of the one-year statutory period.
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, it does not appear that the action was subject to a mandatory settlement conference pursuant to CPLR 3408, as the record indicates that the defendants did not reside at the property at the time the action was commenced. In any event, BANA took no proceedings toward entry of a default judgment against Reddy within one year after the action was released from the foreclosure settlement part on December 15, 2015.
Moreover, Limosa failed to demonstrate any excuse for the delay in taking proceedings for entry of a default judgment against Reddy. Limosa’s contention that BANA had sufficient cause for the delay because BANA had to defend motions made by Nifenecker for leave to serve a late answer is without merit, as Limosa failed to show how opposing those motions hindered BANA from timely taking any steps to initiate proceedings for the entry of a default judgment against Reddy.
Since Limosa failed to set forth a reasonable excuse for the failure to timely take steps to obtain a default judgment against Reddy, the issue of whether it demonstrated a potentially meritorious cause of action need not be reached.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).