On December 28, 2022, the Second Department issued a decision in Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Ams. v. Smith, 2022 NY Slip Op. 07436, holding that where a plaintiff unreasonably fails to move for default judgment within a year of the default, the action must be dismissed, explaining:
In May 2008, the plaintiff commenced this action to foreclose a mortgage against, among others, the defendant David J. Smith, Jr. (hereinafter the defendant). The defendant did not answer. Almost 10 years later, in February 2018, the defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him as abandoned. In an order dated September 26, 2018, the Supreme Court denied that branch of the defendant’s motion. The defendant appeals.
If the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed. To establish sufficient cause, the party opposing dismissal must demonstrate that it had a reasonable excuse for the delay in taking proceedings for entry of a default judgment and that it has a potentially meritorious action. While a court has the discretion to accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse, such excuse must be supported by detailed allegations of fact explaining the law office failure. The determination of whether an excuse is reasonable is committed to the sound discretion of the motion court. Reversal is warranted if that discretion is improvidently exercised.
Here, the plaintiff failed to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year of the defendant’s default and failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its delay. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, compliance with Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts AO/548/10 does not constitute a reasonable excuse for the delay as that order was issued more than one year after the plaintiff’s time to commence proceedings for entry of a default judgment had expired. Likewise, the stay imposed as a result of the defendant’s bankruptcy does not constitute a reasonable excuse since that stay began approximately 3½ years after the plaintiff’s deadline to take proceedings for entry of a default judgment had expired. Finally, the plaintiff proffered only vague, conclusory, and unsubstantiated allegations of law office failure which did not constitute a reasonable excuse. Since the plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient cause why the complaint should not have been dismissed as abandoned insofar as asserted against the defendant, we need not consider whether the plaintiff had a potentially meritorious cause of action.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).