On September 11, 2024, Justice Ruchelsman of the Kings County Commercial Division issued a decision in Tareb v. 65th St., LLC, 2024 NY Slip Op. 33214(U), holding that a merger clause barred a claim based on an alleged oral agreement, explaining:
It is true that a merger clause which states the agreement represents the entire understanding between the parties is to require full application of the parole evidence rule in order to bar the introduction of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of the writing. Thus, there can be no oral modifications changing the terms of the lease. The plaintiff argues that, essentially, the parties entered into a new oral agreement that entirely superseded the lease. However, it cannot seriously be argued that a new agreement was entered into between the parties thereby nullifying the lease itself. Clearly, the lease, with all its myriad provisions controls the duties and rights of the parties. Therefore, pursuant to Paragraph 80 of the rider any changes required a writing. The nature of the change is immaterial. Indeed, there is little distinction between a modification and a superseding event. Any superseding event, such as renovations and an abatement of rent and any modification, such as renovations and an abatement of rent, result in the same change. Thus, there can be no reasonable reliance upon any oral communications allegedly made since a writing was required by the lease.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).