On July 19, 2023, the Second Department issued a decision in Sperry Assoc. Fed. Credit Union v. John, 2023 NY Slip Op. 03880, holding that relation back under CPLR 205-a was available for claims dismissed in favor of a prior pending action, explaining:
Here, even assuming that the defendant established that the filing of the complaint in the 2012 action validly accelerated the debt under the March note, the plaintiff demonstrated that, pursuant to CPLR 205-a, it was entitled to commence this action within six months after the termination of the 2017 action. As part of the recently enacted Foreclosure Abuse Prevention Act (L 2022, ch 821 [eff Dec. 30, 2022]), a new section, CPLR 205-a, which governs the termination of certain actions, including an action upon a bond or note, the payment of which is secured by a mortgage on real property related to real property, was enacted. As relevant here, under both CPLR 205(a) and CPLR 205-a, where an action is timely commenced and is terminated for any reason other than those specified in the statutes, the plaintiff may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence within six months following the termination, provided that the new action would have been timely commenced within the applicable limitations period prescribed by law at the time of the commencement of the prior action and that service upon the original defendant is completed within such six-month period.
CPLR 205-a(a) provides that if an action is timely commenced and is terminated in any manner other than by a voluntary discontinuance, a failure to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, a dismissal of the complaint for any form of neglect, including, but not limited to those specified in [CPLR 3126(3), CPLR 3215, CPLR 3216, and CPLR 3404], for violation of any court rules or individual part rules, for failure to comply with any court scheduling orders, or by default due to nonappearance for conference or at a calendar call, or by failure to timely submit any order or judgment, or upon a final judgment upon the merits, the original plaintiff may commence a new action upon the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences within six months following the termination, provided that the new action would have been timely commenced within the applicable limitations period prescribed by law at the time of the commencement of the prior action and that service upon the original defendant is completed within such six-month period.
Here, the requirements of CPLR 205-a have been satisfied. It is uncontested that the instant action, commenced within six months of termination of the 2017 action, would have been timely commenced in 2017, and that the instant action is based on the same occurrence as the 2017 action, namely, the default on the payment obligations under the March note. Further, it is undisputed that the prior action was not terminated for any reason enumerated in CPLR 205-a.
In her motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred, which was made before CPLR 205-a was enacted, the defendant contended that the six-month extension of time pursuant to CPLR 205(a) is not available to a plaintiff where the prior action was dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4). In support of her contention, the defendant cited to this Court’s decision in Williams v Jian Chu Yu (207 AD2d 442). In Williams, the plaintiffs had originally commenced a medical malpractice action against the defendants in Nassau County. That action (hereinafter the first Nassau County action) ultimately was dismissed due to the plaintiff’s protracted and repeated delays in applying to file a late notice of medical malpractice action and following court directives. However, prior to the issuance of the order directing dismissal of the complaint in the first Nassau County action, the plaintiffs had commenced a second action in Nassau County based on the same allegations (hereinafter the second Nassau County action). By order dated December 9, 1990, the Supreme Court directed dismissal of the complaint in the second Nassau County action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) because the first Nassau County action was then pending (see Williams v Jian Chu Yu, 207 AD2d at 443). Thereafter, on February 11, 1991, the plaintiffs commenced a third action, in Queens County, after the statute of limitations had expired on the cause of action, but within six months of the dismissals of both prior actions. The Supreme Court, Queens County, directed dismissal of the complaint in the third action as time-barred. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that they were entitled to a six-month extension under CPLR 205(a). This Court stated that the complaint in the first Nassau County action had been dismissed after the plaintiffs’ protracted and repeated delays” and so the dismissal was, in effect, for neglect to prosecute. Accordingly, this Court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a six-month extension of time after the dismissal of the complaint in the first Nassau County action, and that the plaintiffs [were] not entitled to a six-month extension of time from the order dated December 6, 1990, which dismissed the second Nassau County action on CPLR 3211(a)(4) grounds, because that dismissal was not the type contemplated by CPLR 205(a).
Thus, in Williams, the plaintiffs had commenced the second Nassau County action in an attempt to circumvent an order of dismissal issued by the Supreme Court in the first Nassau County action effectively based upon the plaintiff’s neglect to prosecute. This Court’s holding in Williams, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the six-month extension of time afforded by CPLR 205(a), is limited to the unique factual and procedural circumstances presented in that case. Williams does not stand for the general proposition that a party whose case is dismissed under CPLR 3211(a)(4) does not get the benefit of a six-month extension pursuant to CPLR 205(a), or under the newly enacted CPLR 205-a. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the plain language of CPLR 205(a) and CPLR 205-a, which each clearly set forth the circumstances in which the statutes do not apply, and a dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) is not one of the enumerated circumstances. Indeed, we note that since we decided Williams in 1994, the case has never been cited for the proposition that CPLR 205(a) does not apply where a prior action has been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4).
Accordingly, even assuming that the complaint in the 2012 action validly accelerated the debt due under the March note, the instant action was timely commenced pursuant to CPLR 205-a, and the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for leave to reargue her prior motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted).